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Abstract—We construct targeted audio adversarial examples
on automatic speech recognition. Given any audio waveform,
we can produce another that is over 99.9% similar, but
transcribes as any phrase we choose (recognizing up to 50
characters per second of audio). We apply our white-box
iterative optimization-based attack to Mozilla’s implementation
DeepSpeech end-to-end, and show it has a 100% success rate.
The feasibility of this attack introduce a new domain to study
adversarial examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the use of neural networks continues to grow, it is
critical to examine their behavior in adversarial settings.
Prior work [8] has shown that neural networks are vulnerable
to adversarial examples [40], instances x′ similar to a
natural instance x, but classified by a neural network as any
(incorrect) target t chosen by the adversary.
Existing work on adversarial examples has focused largely
on the space of images, be it image classification [40], gener-
ative models on images [26], image segmentation [1], face
detection [37], or reinforcement learning by manipulating
the images the RL agent sees [6, 21]. In the discrete domain,
there has been some study of adversarial examples over text
classification [23] and malware classification [16, 20].
There has been comparatively little study on the space of
audio, where the most common use is performing automatic
speech recognition. In automatic speech recognition, a neural
network is given an audio waveform x and perform the
speech-to-text transform that gives the transcription y of the
phrase being spoken (as used in, e.g., Apple Siri, Google
Now, and Amazon Echo).
Constructing targeted adversarial examples on speech
recognition has proven difficult. Hidden and inaudible voice
commands [11, 39, 41] are targeted attacks, but require
synthesizing new audio and can not modify existing audio
(analogous to the observation that neural networks can make
high confidence predictions for unrecognizable images [33]).
Other work has constructed standard untargeted adversarial
examples on different audio systems [13, 24]. The current
state-of-the-art targeted attack on automatic speech recog-
nition is Houdini [12], which can only construct audio
adversarial examples targeting phonetically similar phrases,
leading the authors to state
targeted attacks seem to be much more challenging
when dealing with speech recognition systems
than when we consider artificial visual systems.
Figure 1. Illustration of our attack: given any waveform, adding a small
perturbation makes the result transcribe as any desired target phrase.
Contributions. In this paper, we demonstrate that targeted
adversarial examples exist in the audio domain by attacking
DeepSpeech [18], a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcrip-
tion neural network. Figure 1 illustrates our attack: given any
natural waveform x, we are able to construct a perturbation
δ that is nearly inaudible but so that x+ δ is recognized as
any desired phrase. We are able to achieve this by making
use of strong, iterative, optimization-based attacks based on
the work of [10].
Our white-box attack is end-to-end, and operates directly
on the raw samples that are used as input to the classifier.
This requires optimizing through the MFC pre-processing
transformation, which is has been proven to be difficult
[11]. Our attack works with 100% success, regardless of
the desired transcription or initial source audio sample.
By starting with an arbitrary waveform, such as music, we
can embed speech into audio that should not be recognized
as speech; and by choosing silence as the target, we can hide
audio from a speech-to-text system.
Audio adversarial examples give a new domain to explore
these intriguing properties of neural networks. We hope
others will build on our attacks to further study this field.
To facilitate future work, we make our code and dataset
available1. Additionally, we encourage the reader to listen
to our audio adversarial examples.
1http://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio adversarial examples
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II. BACKGROUND
Neural Networks & Speech Recognition. A neural network
is a differentiable parameterized function f(·). Its parameters
can be updated by gradient descent to learn any function.
We represent audio as a N -dimensional vector x. Each
element xi is a signed 16-bit value, sampled at 16KHz. To
reduce the input dimensionality, the Mel-Frequency Cep-
strum (MFC) transform is often used as a preprocessing
step [18]. The MFC splits the waveform into 50 frames per
second, and maps each frame to the frequency domain.
Standard classification neural networks take one input and
produce an output probability distribution over all output
labels. However, in the case of speech-to-text systems, there
are exponentially many possible labels, making it computa-
tionally infeasible to enumerate all possible phrases.
Therefore, speech recognition systems often use Recur-
rent Neural Networks (RNNs) to map an audio waveform
to a sequence of probability distributions over individual
characters, instead of over complete phrases. An RNN is
a function which maintains a state vector s with s0 = 0 and
(si+1, y
i) = f(si, xi), where the input xi is one frame of
input, and each output yi is a probability distribution over
which character was being spoken during that frame.
We use the DeepSpeech [18] speech-to-text system
(specifically, Mozilla’s implementation [32]). Internally, it
consists of a preprocessing layer which computes the MFC
followed by a recurrent neural network using LSTMs [19].
Connectionist Temporal Classication (CTC) [15] is a
method of training a sequence-to-sequence neural network
when the alignment between the input and output sequences
is not known. DeepSpeech uses CTC because the inputs are
an audio sample of a person speaking, and the unaligned
transcribed sentences, where the exact position of each word
in the audio sample is not known.
We briefly summarize the key details and notation. We
refer readers to [17] for an excellent survey of CTC.
Let X be the input domain — a single frame of input
— and Y be the range — the characters a-z, space, and
the special  token (described below). Our neural network
f : XN → [0, 1]N ·|Y| takes a sequence of N frames x ∈ X
and returns a probability distribution over the output domain
for each frame. We write f(x)ij to mean that the probability
of frame xi ∈ X having label j ∈ Y . We use p to denote a
phrase: a sequence of characters 〈pi〉, where each pi ∈ Y .
While f(·) maps every frame to a probability distribution
over the characters, this does not directly give a probability
distribution over all phrases. The probability of a phrase is
defined as a function of the probability of each character.
We begin with two short definitions. We say that a
sequence pi reduces to p if starting with pi and making the
following two operations (in order) yields p:
1) Remove all sequentially duplicated tokens.
2) Remove all  tokens.
For example, the sequence a a b   b reduces to a b b.
Further, we say that pi is an alignment of p with respect
to y (formally: pi ∈ Π(p,y)) if (a) pi reduces to p, and (b)
the length of pi is equal to the length of y. The probability
of alignment pi under y is the product of the likelihoods of
each of its elements:
Pr(pi|y) =
∏
i
yipii
With these definitions, we can now define the probability
of a given phrase p under the distribution y = f(x) as
Pr(p|y) =
∑
pi∈Π(p,y)
Pr(pi|y) =
∑
pi∈Π(p,y)
∏
i
yipii
As is usually done, the loss function used to train the
network is the negative log likelihood of the desired phrase:
CTC-Loss(f(x),p) = − log Pr(p|f(x)).
Despite the exponential search space, this loss can be
computed efficiently with dynamic programming [15].
Finally, to decode a vector y to a phrase p, we search for
the phrase p that best aligns to y.
C(x) = arg max
p
Pr(p|f(x)).
Because computing C(·) requires searching an exponen-
tial space, it is typically approximated in one of two ways.
• Greedy Decoding searches for the most likely align-
ment (which is easy to find) and then reduces this
alignment to obtain the transcribed phrase:
Cgreedy(x) = reduce(arg max
pi
Pr(pi|f(x)))
• Beam Search Decoding simultaneously evaluates the
likelihood of multiple alignments pi and then chooses
the most likely phrase p under these alignments. We
refer the reader to [15] for a complete algorithm de-
scription.
Adversarial Examples. Evasion attacks have long been
studied on machine learning classifiers [4, 5, 29], and are
practical against many types of models [8].
When discussion neural networks, these evasion attacks
are referred to as adversarial examples [40]: for any input
x, it is possible to construct a sample x′ that is similar to x
(according to some metric) but so that C(x) 6= C(x′) [8]. In
the audio domain, these untargeted adversarial example are
usually not interesting: causing a speech-to-text system to
transcribe “test sentence” as the misspelled “test sentense”
does little to help an adversary.
Targeted Adversarial Examples are a more powerful at-
tack: not only must the classification of x and x′ differ,
but the network must assign a specific label (chosen by the
adversary) to the instance x′. The purpose of this paper is
to show that targeted adversarial examples are possible with
only slight distortion on speech-to-text systems.
III. AUDIO ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
A. Threat Model & Evaluation Benchmark
Threat Model. Given an audio waveform x, and target tran-
scription y, our task is to construct another audio waveform
x′ = x + δ so that x and x′ sound similar (formalized
below), but so that C(x′) = y. We report success only if
the output of the network matches exactly the target phrase
(i.e., contains no misspellings or extra characters).
We assume a white-box setting where the adversary has
complete knowledge of the model and its parameters. This
is the threat model taken in most prior work [14]. Just
as later work in the space of images showed black-box
attacks are possible [22, 35]; we expect that our attacks can
be extended to black-box attacks. Additionally, we assume
our adversarial examples are directly classified without any
noise introduced (e.g., by playing them over-the-air and then
recording them with a microphone). Initial work on image-
based adversarial examples also made this same assumption,
which was later shown unnecessary [2, 27].
Distortion Metric. How should we quantify the distortion
introduced by a perturbation δ? In the space of images,
despite some debate [36], most of the community has settled
on lp metrics [10], most often using l∞ [14, 30], the
maximum amount any pixel has been changed. We follow
this convention for our audio attacks.
We measure distortion in Decibels (dB): a logarithmic
scale that measures the relative loudness of an audio sample:
dB(x) = max
i
20 · log10(xi).
To say that some signal is “10 dB” is only meaningful when
comparing it relative to some other reference point. In this
paper, we compare the dB level of the distortion δ to the
original waveform x. To make this explicit, we write
dBx(δ) = dB(δ)− dB(x).
Because the perturbation introduced is quieter than the
original signal, the distortion is a negative number, where
smaller values indicate quieter distortions.
While this metric may not be a perfect measure of
distortion, as long as the perturbation is small enough, it
will be imperceptible to humans. We encourage the reader
to listen to our adversarial examples to hear how similar
they sound. Alternatively, later, in Figure 2, we visualize two
waveforms which transcribe to different phrases overlaid.
Evaluation Benchmark. To evaluate the effectiveness of
our attack, we construct targeted audio adversarial examples
on the first 100 test instances of the Mozilla Common
Voice dataset. For each sample, we target 10 different
incorrect transcriptions, chosen at random such that (a) the
transcription is incorrect, and (b) it is theoretically possible
to reach that target.
B. An Initial Formulation
As is commonly done [8, 40], we formulate the problem
of constructing an adversarial example as an optimization
problem: given a natural example x and any target phrase t,
we solve the formulation
minimize dBx(δ)
such that C(x+ δ) = t
x+ δ ∈ [−M,M ]
Here M represents the maximum representable value (215
in our case). This constraint can be handled by clipping
the values of δ; for notational simplicity we omit it from
future formulation. Due to the non-linearity of the constraint
C(x + δ) = t, standard gradient-descent techniques do not
work well with this formulation.
Prior work [40] has resolved this through the reformula-
tion
minimize dBx(δ) + c · `(x+ δ, t)
where the loss function `(·) is constructed so that `(x′, t) ≤
0 ⇐⇒ C(x′) = t. The parameter c trades off the relative
importance of being adversarial and remaining close to the
original example.
Constructing a loss function `(·) with this property is
much simpler in the domain of images than in the domain
of audio; on images, f(x′)y directly corresponds to the
probability of the input x′ having label y. In contrast, for
audio, we use a second decoding step to compute C(x′),
and so constructing a loss function is nontrivial.
To begin, we use the CTC loss as the loss function:
`(x′, t) = CTC-Loss(x′, t). For this loss function, one
direction of the implication holds true (i.e., `(x′, t) ≤ 0 =⇒
C(x′) = t) but the converse does not. Fortunately, this
means that the resulting solution will still be adversarial,
it just may not be minimally perturbed.
The second difficulty we must address is that when
using a l∞ distortion metric, this optimization process will
often oscillate around a solution without converging [10].
Therefore, instead we initially solve the formulation
minimize |δ|22 + c · `(x+ δ, t)
such that dBx(δ) ≤ τ
for some sufficiently large constant τ . Upon obtaining a
partial solution δ∗ to the above problem, we reduce τ and
resume minimization, repeating until no solution can be
found.
To solve this formulation, we differentiate through the
entire classifier to generate our adversarial examples —
starting from the audio sample, through the MFC, and neural
network, to the final loss. We solve the minimization prob-
lem over the complete audio sample simultaneously. This
is in contrast with prior work on hidden voice commands
[11], which were generated sequentially, one frame at a time.
We solve the minimization problem with the Adam [25]
optimizer using a learning rate of 10, for a maximum of
5, 000 iterations.
Evaluation. We are able to generate targeted adversarial
examples with 100% success for each of the source-target
pairs with a mean perturbation of −31dB. For comparison,
this is roughly the difference between ambient noise in a
quiet room and a person talking [38]. We encourage the
reader to listen to our audio adversarial examples1. The 95%
interval for distortion ranged from −15dB to −45dB.
The longer a phrase is, the more difficult it is to tar-
get: every extra character requires approximately a 0.1dB
increase in distortion. However, conversely, we observe that
the longer the initial source phrase is, the easier it is to make
it target a given transcription. These two effects roughly
counteract each other (although we were not able to measure
this to a statistically significant degree of certainty).
Generating a single adversarial example requires approxi-
mately one hour of compute time on commodity hardware (a
single NVIDIA 1080Ti). However, due to the massively par-
allel nature of GPUs, we are able to construct 10 adversarial
examples simultaneously, reducing the time for constructing
any given adversarial example to only a few minutes.2
C. Improved Loss Function
Carlini & Wagner [10] demonstrate that the choice of loss
function impacts the final distortion of generated adversarial
examples by a factor of 3 or more. We now show the same
holds in the audio domain, but to a lesser extent. While CTC
loss is highly useful for training the neural network, we show
that a carefully designed loss function allows generating bet-
ter lower-distortion adversarial examples. For the remainder
of this section, we focus on generating adversarial examples
that are only effective when using greedy decoding.
In order to minimize the CTC loss (as done in § III-B), an
optimizer will make every aspect of the transcribed phrase
more similar to the target phrase. That is, if the target
phrase is “ABCD” and we are already decoding to “ABCX”,
minimizing CTC loss will still cause the “A” to be more
“A”-like, despite the fact that the only important change we
require is for the “X” to be turned into a “D”.
This effect of making items classified more strongly as
the desired label despite already having that label led to the
design of a more effective loss function:
`(y, t) = max
(
yt −max
t′ 6=t
yt′ , 0
)
.
Once the probability of item y is larger than any other item,
the optimizer no longer sees a reduction in loss by making
it more strongly classified with that label.
2Due to implementation difficulties, after constructing adversarial exam-
ples simultaneously, we must fine-tune them individually afterwards.
We now adapt this loss function to the audio domain.
Assume we were given an alignment pi that aligns the phrase
p with the probabilities y. Then the loss of this sequence is
L(x, pi) =
∑
i
`(f(x)i, pii).
We make one further improvement on this loss function.
The constant c used in the minimization formulation deter-
mines the relative importance of being close to the original
symbol versus being adversarial. A larger value of c allows
the optimizer to place more emphasis on reducing `(·).
In audio, consistent with prior work [11] we observe that
certain characters are more difficult for the transcription to
recognize. When we choose only one constant c for the
complete phrase, it must be large enough so that we can
make the most difficult character be transcribed correctly.
This forces c to be larger than necessary for the easier-to-
target segments. To resolve this issue, we instead use the
following formulation:
minimize |δ|22 +
∑
i
ci · Li(x+ δ, pii)
such that dBx(δ) < τ
where Li(x, pii) = `(f(x)i, pii). Computing the loss func-
tion requires choice of an alignment pi. If we were not
concerned about runtime efficiency, in principle we could try
all alignments pi ∈ Π(p) and select the best one. However,
this is computationally prohibitive.
Instead, we use a two-step attack:
1) First, we let x0 be an adversarial example found using
the CTC loss (following §III-B). CTC loss explicitly
constructs an alignment during decoding. We extract
the alignment pi that is induced by x0 (by computing
pi = arg maxi f(x0)
i). We fix this alignment pi and
use it as the target in the second step.
2) Next, holding the alignment pi fixed, we generate
a less-distorted adversarial example x′ targeting the
alignment pi using the improved loss function above
to minimize |δ|22 +
∑
i ci ·`i(x+δ, pi), starting gradient
descent at the initial point δ = x0 − x.
Evaluation. We repeat the evaluation from Section III-B
(above), and generate targeted adversarial examples for the
first 100 instances of the Common Voice test set. We are
able to reduce the mean distortion from −31dB to −38dB.
However, the adversarial examples we generate are now only
guaranteed to be effective against a greedy decoder; against a
beam-search decoder, the transcribed phrases are often more
similar to the target phrase than the original phrase, but do
not perfectly match the target.
Figure 2 shows two waveforms overlaid; the blue, thick
line is the original waveform, and the orange, thin line the
modified adversarial waveform. This sample was chosen
randomly from among the training data, and corresponds to
Figure 2. Original waveform (blue, thick line) with adversarial waveform
(orange, thin line) overlaid; it is nearly impossible to notice a difference.
The audio waveform was chosen randomly from the attacks generated and
is 500 samples long.
a distortion of −30dB. Even visually, these two waveforms
are nearly indistinguishable.
D. Audio Information Density
Recall that the input waveform is converted into 50
frames per second of audio, and DeepSpeech outputs one
probability distribution of characters per frame. This places
the theoretical maximum density of audio at 50 characters
per second. We are able to generate adversarial examples
that produce output at this maximum rate. Thus, short audio
clips can transcribe to a long textual phrase.
The loss function `(·) is simpler in this setting. The only
alignment of p to y is the assignment pi = p. This means that
the logit-based loss function can be applied directly without
first heuristically finding an alignment; any other alignment
would require omitting some character.
We perform this attack and find it is effective, although
it requires a mean distortion of −18dB.
E. Starting from Non-Speech
Not only are we able to construct adversarial examples
that cause DeepSpeech to transcribe the incorrect text for a
person’s speech, we are also able to begin with arbitrary non-
speech audio sample and make that recognize as any target
phrase. No technical novelty on top of what was developed
above is required to mount this attack: we only let the initial
audio waveform be non-speech.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this attack, we take five-
second clips from classical music (which contain no speech)
and target phrases contained in the Common Voice dataset.
We have found that this attack requires more computational
effort (we perform 20, 000 iterations of gradient descent) and
the total distortion is slightly larger, with a mean of −20dB.
F. Targeting Silence
Finally, we find it is possible to hide speech by adding
adversarial noise that causes DeepSpeech to transcribe noth-
ing. While performing this attack without modification (by
just targeting the empty phrase) is effective, we can slightly
improve on this if we define silence to be an arbitrary length
sequence of only the space character repeated. With this
definition, to obtain silence, we should let
`(x) =
∑
i
max
(
max
t∈{,“”}
f(x)it − max
t′ 6∈{,“”}
f(x)it′ , 0
)
.
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Figure 3. CTC loss when interpolating between the original audio sample
and the adversarial example (blue, solid line), compared to traveling equally
far in the direction suggested by the fast gradient sign method (orange,
dashed line). Adversarial examples exist far enough away from the original
audio sample that solely relying on the local linearity of neural networks
is insufficient to construct targeted adversarial examples.
We find that targeting silence is easier than targeting a
specific phrase: with distortion less than −45dB below the
original signal, we can turn any phrase into silence.
This partially explains why it is easier to construct adver-
sarial examples when starting with longer audio waveforms
than shorter ones: because the longer phrase contains more
sounds, the adversary can silence the ones that are not
required and obtain a subsequence that nearly matches the
target. In contrast, for a shorter phrase, the adversary must
synthesize new characters that did not exist previously.
IV. AUDIO ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE PROPERTIES
A. Evaluating Single-Step Methods
In contrast to prior work which views adversarial exam-
ples as “blind spots” of a neural network, Goodfellow et
al. [14] argue that adversarial examples are largely effective
due to the locally linear nature of neural networks.
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [14] demon-
strates that this is true in the space of images. FGSM takes
a single step in the direction of the gradient of the loss
function. That is, given network F with loss function `, we
compute the adversarial example as
x′ ← x−  · sign(∇x`(x, y)).
Intuitively, for each pixel in an image, this attack asks “in
which direction should we modify this pixel to minimize the
loss?” and then taking a small step in that direction for every
pixel simultaneously. This attack can be applied directly to
audio, changing individual samples instead of pixels.
However, we find that this type of single-step attack is not
effective on audio adversarial examples: the inherent non-
linearity introduced in computing the MFCCs, along with
the depth of many rounds of LSTMs, introduces a large
degree of non-linearity in the output.
In Figure 3 we compare the value of the CTC loss
when traveling in the direction of a known adversarial
example, compared to traveling in the fast gradient sign
direction. While initially (near the source audio sample),
the fast gradient direction is more effective at reducing the
loss function, it quickly plateaus and does not decrease
afterwards. On the other hand, using iterative optimization-
based attacks find a direction that eventually leads to an
adversarial example. (Only when the CTC loss is below 10
does the phrase have the correct transcription.)
We do, however, observe that the FGSM can be used to
produce untargeted audio adversarial examples, that make a
phrase misclassified (although optimization methods again
can do so with less distortion).
B. Robustness of Adversarial Examples
The minimally perturbed adversarial examples we con-
struct in Section III-B can be made non-adversarial by trivial
modifications to the input. Here, we demonstrate here that
it is possible to construct adversarial examples robust to
various forms of noise.
Robustness to pointwise noise. Given an adversarial exam-
ple x′, adding pointwise random noise σ to x′ and returning
C(x+ σ) will cause x′ to lose its adversarial label, even if
the distortion σ is small enough to allow normal examples
to retain their classification.
We generate a high confidence adversarial example x′
[8, 10], and make use of Expectation over Transforms [2]
to generate an adversarial example robust to this synthetic
noise at −30dB. The adversarial perturbation increases by
approximately 10dB when we do this.
Robustness to MP3 compression. Following [3], we make
use of the straight-through estimator [7] to construct adver-
sarial examples robust to MP3 compression. We generate an
adversarial example x′ such that C(MP3(x′)) is classified
as the target label by computing gradients of the CTC-Loss
assuming that the gradient of the MP3 compression is the
identity function. While individual gradient steps are likely
not correct, in aggregate the gradients average out to become
useful. This allows us to generate adversarial examples with
approximately 15dB larger distortion that remain robust to
MP3 compression.
V. OPEN QUESTIONS
Can these attacks be played over-the-air? Image-based
adversarial examples have been shown to be feasible in the
physical world [2, 27]. In the audio space, both hidden voice
commands and Dolphin Attack’s inaudible voice commands
are effective over-the-air when played by a speaker and
recorded by a microphone [11, 41].
The audio adversarial examples we construct in this paper
do not remain adversarial after being played over-the-air, and
therefore present a limited real-world threat; however, just as
the initial work on image-based adversarial examples did not
consider the physical channel and only later was it shown to
be possible, we believe further work will be able to produce
audio adversarial examples that are effective over-the-air.
Do universal adversarial perturbations [31] exist? One
surprising observation is that on the space of images, it
is possible to construct a single perturbation δ that when
applied to an arbitrary image x will make its classification
incorrect. These attacks would be powerful on audio, and
would correspond to a perturbation that could be played to
cause any other waveform to recognize as a target phrase.
Are audio adversarial examples transferable? That is,
given an audio sample x, can we generate a single pertur-
bation δ so that fi(x + δ) = y for multiple classifiers fi?
Transferability is believed to be a fundamental property of
neural networks [34], significantly complicates constructing
robust defenses [9], and allows attackers to mount black-box
attacks [28]. Evaluating transferability on the audio domain
is an important direction for future work.
Which existing defenses can be applied audio? To the
best of our knowledge, all existing defenses to adversarial
examples have only been evaluated on image domains. If the
defender’s objective is to produce a robust neural network,
then it should improve resistance to adversarial examples on
all domains, not just on images. Audio adversarial examples
give another point of comparison.
VI. CONCLUSION
We demonstrate targeted audio adversarial examples
are effective on automatic speech recognition. With
optimization-based attacks applied end-to-end, we are able
to turn any audio waveform into any target transcription with
100% success by only adding a slight distortion. We can
cause audio to transcribe up to 50 characters per second (the
theoretical maximum), cause music to transcribe as arbitrary
speech, and hide speech from being transcribed.
We present preliminary evidence that audio adversarial
examples have different properties from those on images by
showing that linearity does not hold on the audio domain.
We hope that future work will continue to investigate audio
adversarial examples, and separate the fundamental prop-
erties of adversarial examples from properties which occur
only on image recognition.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by National Science Foundation
award CNS-1514457, Qualcomm, and the Hewlett Founda-
tion through the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Arnab, O. Miksik, and P. H. Torr. On the robustness of se-
mantic segmentation models to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.09856, 2017.
[2] A. Athalye, L. Engstrom, A. Ilyas, and K. Kwok. Synthesizing robust
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397, 2017.
[3] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give
a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420, 2018.
[4] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, R. Sears, A. D. Joseph, and J. D. Tygar.
Can machine learning be secure? In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM
Symposium on Information, computer and communications security,
pages 16–25. ACM, 2006.
[5] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, A. D. Joseph, and J. Tygar. The security of
machine learning. Machine Learning, 81(2):121–148, 2010.
[6] V. Behzadan and A. Munir. Vulnerability of deep reinforcement
learning to policy induction attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1701.04143,
2017.
[7] Y. Bengio, N. Le´onard, and A. Courville. Estimating or propagating
gradients through stochastic neurons for conditional computation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1308.3432, 2013.
[8] B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Sˇrndic´, P. Laskov,
G. Giacinto, and F. Roli. Evasion attacks against machine learning at
test time. In Joint European Conference on Machine Learning and
Knowledge Discovery in Databases, pages 387–402. Springer, 2013.
[9] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Magnet and ”efficient defenses against
adversarial attacks” are not robust to adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.08478, 2017.
[10] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on,
pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[11] N. Carlini, P. Mishra, T. Vaidya, Y. Zhang, M. Sherr, C. Shields,
D. Wagner, and W. Zhou. Hidden voice commands. In 25th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16), Austin, TX, 2016.
[12] M. Cisse, Y. Adi, N. Neverova, and J. Keshet. Houdini: Fooling deep
structured prediction models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.05373, 2017.
[13] Y. Gong and C. Poellabauer. Crafting adversarial examples for speech
paralinguistics applications. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.03280, 2017.
[14] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[15] A. Graves, S. Ferna´ndez, F. Gomez, and J. Schmidhuber. Connection-
ist temporal classification: labelling unsegmented sequence data with
recurrent neural networks. In Proceedings of the 23rd international
conference on Machine learning, pages 369–376. ACM, 2006.
[16] K. Grosse, N. Papernot, P. Manoharan, M. Backes, and P. McDaniel.
Adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks for malware
classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04435, 2016.
[17] A. Hannun. Sequence modeling with ctc. Distill, 2017. doi: 10.
23915/distill.00008. https://distill.pub/2017/ctc.
[18] A. Hannun, C. Case, J. Casper, B. Catanzaro, G. Diamos, E. Elsen,
R. Prenger, S. Satheesh, S. Sengupta, A. Coates, et al. Deep
speech: Scaling up end-to-end speech recognition. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.5567, 2014.
[19] S. Hochreiter and J. Schmidhuber. Long short-term memory. Neural
computation, 9(8):1735–1780, 1997.
[20] W. Hu and Y. Tan. Generating adversarial malware examples for
black-box attacks based on gan. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.05983,
2017.
[21] S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and P. Abbeel.
Adversarial attacks on neural network policies. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.02284, 2017.
[22] A. Ilyas, L. Engstrom, A. Athalye, and J. Lin. Query-efficient black-
box adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.07113, 2017.
[23] R. Jia and P. Liang. Adversarial examples for evaluating reading
comprehension systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07328, 2017.
[24] C. Kereliuk, B. L. Sturm, and J. Larsen. Deep learning and music
adversaries. IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, 17(11):2059–2071,
2015.
[25] D. Kingma and J. Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[26] J. Kos, I. Fischer, and D. Song. Adversarial examples for generative
models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06832, 2017.
[27] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial examples in
the physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[28] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song. Delving into transfer-
able adversarial examples and black-box attacks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.02770, 2016.
[29] D. Lowd and C. Meek. Adversarial learning. In Proceedings of
the eleventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery in data mining, pages 641–647. ACM, 2005.
[30] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu. Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
[31] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Uni-
versal adversarial perturbations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.08401,
2016.
[32] Mozilla. Project deepspeech. https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech,
2017.
[33] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune. Deep neural networks are easily
fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 427–436, 2015.
[34] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow. Transferability in
machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using ad-
versarial samples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07277, 2016.
[35] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against deep learning systems
using adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.02697, 2016.
[36] A. Rozsa, E. M. Rudd, and T. E. Boult. Adversarial diversity and
hard positive generation. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops, pages 25–32,
2016.
[37] M. Sharif, S. Bhagavatula, L. Bauer, and M. K. Reiter. Accessorize to
a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition.
In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 1528–1540. ACM, 2016.
[38] S. W. Smith et al. The scientist and engineer’s guide to digital signal
processing. 1997.
[39] L. Song and P. Mittal. Inaudible voice commands. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.07238, 2017.
[40] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfel-
low, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. ICLR,
2013.
[41] G. Zhang, C. Yan, X. Ji, T. Zhang, T. Zhang, and W. Xu. Dolphinat-
ack: Inaudible voice commands. CCS, 2017.
